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INTRODUCTION Daniel W. Hamilton 809
I. ARTICLES
A HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES
AND POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM Morton J. Horwitz 813
The People Themselves intervenes in a growing contemporary debate about
the role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional system that began to emerge
after the end of the Warren Court and reached a crescendo with Bush v. Gore.
For the second time since Lochner v. New York was decided, some liberals have
begun once again to switch sides on the virtues of judicial review. Many recent
liberal books and articles inevitably bring to mind the flood of Progressive at-
tacks on the democratic legitimacy of judicial review written between 1905 and
1937. Yet the book can be approached independently of its clear effort to ad-
vance one version of the current anti-judicial review agenda. The book has two
overall goals. The first is to establish that a legitimate practice of popular consti-
tutionalism -of the "people outdoors" exercising a separate and independent
voice in constitutional debate-was well in place by the time of the American
Revolution. The second goal is to demonstrate that the arguments for judicial
supremacy-expressly articulated in Cooper v. Aaron and acted upon in Bush v.
Gore-have been drowned out until recently by a "departmental" theory of judi-
cial review. The claim that judicial supremacy is a very recent development in
constitutional history is not new, but Kramer's elaboration of the various paths
to judicial supremacy and the real life significance of the competing theories of
judicial review left behind, is important and original.
A DISCRETE AND COSMOPOLITAN MINORITY:
THE LOYALISTS, THE ATLANTIC WORLD, AND
THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW Daniel J. Hulsebosch 825
Historical interest in popular constitutionalism has enlivened the search for
the origins of judicial review. Several precursors of judicial review in the state
courts during the 1780s, in particular, demand explanation. If early modern An-
glo-Americans did not perceive courts as enforcers of constitutional limits on
legislatures, what explains these attempts by judges to curtail statutes in the
"critical period" before the Philadelphia Convention? This article argues that
these cases involved antiloyalist legislation and related laws that violated the
Peace Treaty of 1783 or the law of nations, or otherwise obstructed diplomatic
and commercial relations with the other empires of the Atlantic world. Lawyers
and judges drew on available legal scripts-such as the customary liberties of
Englishmen and the notion of imperial supremacy-to argue that courts had the
power to curb state legislation that infringed on these superior sources of law.
This use of the courts fitted into a larger, Federalist constitutional program that
was designed to reintegrate the United States into the Atlantic world.
IREDELL RECLAIMED: FAREWELL To SNOWISS'S
HISTORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW Gerald Leonard 867
Even after the publication of Larry Kramer's The People Themselves, the
early history of judicial review suffers from the unfortunate influence of Sylvia
Snowiss's Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution. Snowiss misread,
among other things, James Iredell's foundational argument in 1786 for the inevi-
tability and necessity of judicial review. Snowiss claimed that early understand-
ings of judicial review conceptualized it not as a legal doctrine but as a doctrine
of political and revolutionary resistance. In fact, however, Iredell argued for judi-
cial review as a straightforward, legalistic consequence of popular sovereignty. In
Iredell's influential account, the transition from the British theory of legislative
sovereignty to the American theory of popular sovereignty also brought a shift in
the relations between legislative and judicial power (the separation of powers).
The central implication for the courts was that they could no longer hide behind
legislative authority. The judges now had to ensure their own authority to act by
reference to the people's constitutions, lest they themselves illegally coerce the
citizenry. Moreover, there was nothing in such a theory to suggest deference to
the legislature when doing constitutional interpretation (Snowiss's "doubtful
case rule"). When such a rule was embraced by Iredell and others, it seems not
to have been a "corollary" of Snowiss's theory of early judicial review at all.
Rather, it appears to have been a pragmatic concession to those who continued
to resist Iredell's lawyerly logic.
MOBS, MILITIAS, AND MAGISTRATES:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
THE WHISKEY REBELLION Saul Cornell 883
It is impossible to understand the Constitutional dynamics of the early Re-
public without some appreciation for the manifold ways popular constitutional-
ism shaped these early debates. Popular constitutionalism in the early republic
encompassed an enormous spectrum of legal strategies. The peaceful efforts of
the Democratic-Republican Societies to influence the course of Federalist policy
stood at one pole, while mob action stood at the other. Even more important
than either of these modalities of popular constitutionalism were the efforts of
local communities and states to use the militia as check on federal power.
PRE-REVOLUTIONARY POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND LARRY KRAMER'S
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES Richard J. Ross 905
Larry Kramer's depiction of pre-Revolutionary constitutionalism rests on
two dichotomies that are valuable yet exclude middle positions. First, he distin-
guishes between fundamental law and ordinary law. Second, he argues that pre-
Revolutionary judges could play one of two roles-since they were not supreme
constitutional interpreters (the first of these roles), they must have possessed no
special authority to determine constitutional meanings (the second, and remain-
ing, possibility). Both of these dichotomies obscure middle positions that capture
important aspects of the pre-Revolutionary constitutional tradition. My com-
ments briefly identify these middle positions and suggest what is at stake in re-
covering them.
GIVE "THE PEOPLE"
WHAT THEY WANT? Keith E. Whittington 911
Larry Kramer's The People Themselves argues that "popular constitutional-
ism" has been the dominant tradition over the course of American history, being
eclipsed by "judicial supremacy" only in the last decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. He posits that political parties have, since the age of Andrew Jackson, been
the vehicle for pushing back the forces of judicial supremacy. This article argues
that political parties are instead deeply implicated in the political dynamic that
gives rise to judicial supremacy in the United States. The article identifies the
features of the early party system that allowed it serve the popular constitution-
alist function that Kramer emphasizes. It then shows that these are relatively
rare features of American politics. Under more common political conditions,
party leaders have ample incentives to encourage the growth of judicial
supremacy precisely in order to advance the substantive constitutional commit-
ments to which those political leaders adhere.
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM, JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY, AND THE COMPLETE
LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES Mark A. Graber 923
The complete history of the Lincoln-Douglas debates provides additional
support for the main thesis of Larry Kramer's The People Themselves: Popular
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, while casting doubt on a subtheme. The
Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1840 are yet another instance when judicial power
was contested in American history. Professor Kramer, however, treats American
constitutional history as an ongoing struggle between aristocrats who support
judicial supremacy and "democrats" committed to a more popular constitution-
alism. The complete Lincoln-Douglas debates suggest that political struggles to
control constitutional meaning have been more protean. Douglas was one of
many ambitious politicians who rose to power championing popular constitu-
tionalism, but after political allies established control over the courts, found judi-
cial supremacy a useful means for stabilizing their political coalition, for
exercising authority over resisting localities, and for entrenching their policy
preferences. Lincoln was one of many ambitious politicians who first defended
courts as a bulwark against an insurgent political movement with an alternative
constitutional vision and then, after the insurgents had consolidated power and
gained control over the judiciary, attacked courts when leading an different in-
surgent political movement with an alternative constitutional vision. Douglas in
1840 and Lincoln in 1858 were attacking institutions controlled by their political
rivals and regarded appeals to popular constitutionalism as efforts to transfer
constitutional authority to institutions they believed more favorably disposed to
their constitutional vision. Lincoln in 1840 and Douglas in 1858 were defending
institutions controlled by their political supporters and regarded appeals to pop-
ular constitutionalism as efforts to transfer constitutional authority to institutions
they believed less favorably disposed to their constitutional vision.
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE
CIVIL WAR: A TRIAL RUN Daniel W. Hamilton 953
The Civil War was widely recognized, at the time and since, as a moment of
popular constitutionalism, at least in so far as the Supreme Court was made sud-
denly less powerful as an interpreter of the Constitution on the eve of the war.
The Court was largely marginalized on constitutional questions during the war,
in large part as a result of the Dred Scott Case, which Charles Evans Hughes
described as one of the great "self-inflicted wounds" in the history of the Su-
preme Court.
If today, in a time of war, we look readily to the courts to ultimately deline-
ate who is and who is not an "enemy combatant," to determine what process
detainees are due, and to decide what is torture and what is not, the Civil War is
an instance when wartime constitutional decisions were made in the relative ab-
sence of a powerful Supreme Court and even in defiance of it. The Civil War has
an arguably unique role inside the history of popular constitutionalism. It is a
valuable test case, a sort of trial run for a popular constitutional regime that
operated in a time of terrible crisis alongside a marginalized Supreme Court, just
as a spate of new and urgent constitutional questions demanded immediate
resolution.
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY: Reflections on the
Dark Side, the Progressive Constitutional
Imagination, and the Enduring Role of
Judicial Finality in Popular Understandings
of Popular Self-Rule William E. Forbath 967
This essay aims to revise and strengthen some important features of Larry
Kramer's pioneering account of popular constitutionalism, particularly during
the last century, which Kramer covers on the run. In doing so, the essay also
complicates the normative path of Kramer's narrative. First, I discuss the role of
racism in shaping American popular constitutionalism and its rivals. The People
Themselves has been assailed for glossing over this and other dark chapters in
popular constitutionalism's history. I sketch how and why Kramer's narrative
should take these dark chapters on board. Next, I turn to the Progressive Era
and the New Deal. In both these moments, Kramer argues, when matters came
to a head, Americans "chose popular constitutionalism" over judicial finality. In
fact, I argue, Americans preferred to have it both ways. While Progressives' and
New Dealers' attacks on conservative judicial doctrines enjoyed broad support,
efforts to demote the courts and institute more democratic allocations of inter-
pretive authority never gained broad and deep popular approval. The Progres-
sive Era was the first and last time Americans seriously considered profound
institutional changes aimed at enlarging ordinary citizens' role in determining
the meaning of the Constitution and the course of its development. Progressive
efforts to rethink popular self-rule and make constitutionalism more democratic
in a modern, urbanized America were deep and systematic-more so than
Kramer's or any of today's constitutional thinkers. What can we learn from
them? Popular political sway over constitutional questions in both eras stood in
tension with a conservative current of popular skepticism about the people's col-
lective enthusiasms about the uses of state power, a current that ran in favor of
judicial finality. Americans refused to forsake the ideal or myth of judicially en-
forceable constitutional commitments standing obdurately above and beyond the
sway of non-judicial political actors.
Throughout the twentieth century, I suggest, even in the thick of popular
constitutional battles against the courts, Americans associated judicial finality
with the stability of firm, unduckable, law-ike constitutional guarantees. They
disagreed about what rights the Constitution vouchsafed and about what rights
were properly safeguarded by courts. But on all sides, they were believers in the
indispensability of judicial finality in respect of some important set of rights,
which they deemed essential to their rival conceptions of popular self-rule and
constitutional democracy. This basic agreement on the virtues of judicial finality
across the liberal-conservative divide, which Kramer bemoans as a late twentieth
century development, arose many decades earlier. But contrary to Kramer, I do
not find that this agreement has spelled the demise of popular constitutionalism.
From the New Deal right down to the present, party politics and social move-
ments, including movements to amend the Constitution, have been lively sites of
popular involvement in-and popular influence over-the nation's constitu-
tional development.
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AS
POLITICAL LAW Mark Tushnet 991
The People Themselves develops the idea that constitutional law is a special
kind of law, political law. Examining some of the book's reviews, this Article
explains how political law can be developed through relatively unstructured in-
teractions among the people, political leaders in Congress and the presidency,
and the courts. It argues that understanding how constitutional law as political
law is developed requires, not the development of crisp analytic criteria, but
close historical analysis of particular interactions. The Article identifies criteria
for evaluating how popular constitutionalism compares to judicial review as a
mechanism for enforcing constitutional rights, arguing that a serious evaluation
requires much more complex analysis than some critics have suggested.
POLITICS, POLICE, PAST AND PRESENT:
LARRY KRAMER'S
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES Christopher Tomlins 1007
This article addresses aspects of the debate over Larry Kramer's The People
Themselves and, more generally, current interest in popular constitutionalism
before engaging, briefly, with the book itself. Because I find Kramer's book in
general terms unexceptionable I see no particular reason to engage in the kind of
lengthy critical assessment undertaken by those scholars whose disagreements
with the book are pronounced. Instead I focus on three "sites" that the book
traverses that I consider sites of missed opportunity. They are, first, the question
of the people and the Constitution; second, the people and politics; third, the
question of police and law. I conclude with some thoughts on Kramer's resort to
history-the question of past and present.
PREEMPTING THE PEOPLE: THE JUDICIAL
ROLE IN REGULATORY CONCURRENCY
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
POPULAR LAWMAKING Theodore W. Ruger 1029
The phrase "popular constitutionalism" most commonly refers to the role of
the public-or perhaps its elected representatives-in framing answers to partic-
ular substantive questions of constitutional interpretation. This essay explores a
different aspect of the popular constitution of the United States, one that is indif-
ferent to particular substantive questions but that forms the basic structure in
which most lawmaking takes place. The United States is not merely a federal
system but one with concurrent federalism, in which many issues are regulated
by both state and federal governments. This norm of regulatory concurrency be-
came entrenched in the twentieth century even as the scope and depth of posi-
tive regulation of many social and economic issues proliferated. I argue that this
concurrency norm itself is an important part of the public's constitution, in that it
permits the public multiple outlets for lawmaking, in which different coalitions
and actors may prevail at least temporarily. The federal judiciary has played, and
will play, a central role in constructing and preserving this concurrent structure,
and with it the multiple spaces for public lawmaking that exist. Where Congress
has regulated at least part of a regulatory field, courts are often faced with the
question of how broadly to trump, or preempt, state regulation of the same topic.
After much judicial disagreement in the first 150 years of the nation's existence,
by the New Deal era federal courts had embraced the concurrent idea of regula-
tion as opposed to a more parsimonious theory of exclusivity arising from incre-
mental federal regulation. By embracing this concurrency idea the Supreme
Court enabled the proliferation and coexistence of both federal and state posi-
tive law in the later twentieth century. In the past decade, however, the Supreme
Court and other federal courts have displayed more ambivalence on this point
and have been demonstrably more willing to infer federal exclusivity even absent
a clear Congressional statement, a development with troubling consequences for
popular lawmaking.
TOM DELAY: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALIST? Neal Devins 1055
Focusing on congressional efforts to override state court decisionmaking in
the Terri Schiavo case, this essay examines some of the practical problems associ-
ated with implementing Larry Kramer's popular constitutionalism. In particular,
lawmakers will invoke the "will of the people" when, in fact, they are pursuing
special interest politics. More than that, the Schiavo case calls attention to the
increasing partisanship within Congress. This partisanship, contrary to the objec-
tives of popular constitutionalism, makes lawmakers less likely to advance the
national interest and more likely to focus their energies on their increasingly
partisan base. For this very reason, today's Congress is less likely to facilitate
Kramer's project than earlier Congresses.
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AS
PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM? David L. Franklin 1069
This essay, which focuses on Larry Kramer's book The People Themselves,
makes three points. First, although Kramer makes popular constitutionalism the
conceptual centerpiece of his book, it's not at all clear what popular constitution-
alism is. Kramer's work can be read to embody two very different versions of
popular constitutionalism: a populist sensibility model and a departmentalist
model. Second, whichever model Kramer has in mind, he has performed a valua-
ble service by reminding us that the meaning of the Constitution is not identical
to the doctrines the Supreme Court uses to implement that meaning. Third, pop-
ular constitutionalism in 2006 may in practice mean presidential constitutional-
ism-an outcome that should give us cause for concern. The essay concludes
with two brief case studies, involving medical marijuana and warrantless wiretap-
ping. Both case studies raise questions about the President's capacity to develop
independent, reasonable constitutional understandings in a deliberative and
transparent way.
CONSTITUTIONAL EDUCATION FOR
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES Sheldon Nahmod 1091
Professor Nahmod, like Dean Kramer, remains profoundly disturbed by the
Supreme Court's triumphalist decision in Bush v. Gore. However, he does not go
so far as Dean Kramer in arguing normatively for a return to "popular constitu-
tionalism." Rather, his more modest position is that the Supreme Court, Con-
gress, and the President, together with the bar and the media, have a normative
obligation to educate "the people themselves" in constitutional matters. This
often-overlooked and vitally important "constitutional education" of the people
is based on the self-government rationale of both our constitutional structure
and the First Amendment. Professor Nahmod suggests how to promote the peo-
ple's constitutional education.
COMMENT: POPULAR LAW AND THE
DOUBTFUL CASE RULE Frank I. Michelman 1109
A "doubtful case" or "clear mistake" rule is a rule calling for substantial
deference by a reviewing court to a legislature's implicit affirmation of the con-
stitutional probity of the statutes it enacts. Americans of the early Republic re-
portedly found a grounding for such a rule of judicial conduct in a conception of
constitutional law as popular (not "ordinary") law. On examination, it proves
difficult to trace a persuasive connection between the popular-law conception
and demands for judicial adherence to a rule of deference to the implicit consti-
tutional judgments of legislatures. Rather, the popular law conception calls for a
kind of departmentalist approach to judicial review, one that would reject judicial
deference to the contemporaneous constitutional judgments of legislatures. Def-
erence would seem more in keeping with Alexander's Bickel's dismissal of the
constitution-writing "people" as "an abstraction" than with popular constitution-
alism's evocation of them as a real, live, active presence in the contemporary
scene.
KRAMER'S POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM.
A QUICK NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT Sarah Harding 1117
This paper steps outside of the historical debate about the origins and devel-
opment of judicial review and focuses on the normative claim that Kramer
makes near the end of Popular Constitutionalism. Should the Court, as Kramer
argues, have a little more humility when it comes to judicial review and its au-
thority over constitutional interpretation? Should the Court have more respect
for legislative decision-making? These questions are addressed through a brief
exploration of the ideas of a leading skeptic of judicial review, Jeremy Waldron,
and a glimpse at the experiences of other rights-respecting nations.
KATRINA, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
LEGAL QUESTION DOCTRINE Robin West 1127
The article argues that the non-existence of welfare rights in American Con-
stitutional law, and the non-existence of a widely shared sense of moral obliga-
tion to attend to poverty through the use of law, cannot be explained by
reference to the Constitutional text or history. Rather, it is a function of the
over-identification of ordinary morality with Constitutionalism, of the Constitu-
tion with law, and of law, with adjudicative law-what the article calls "the legal
question doctrine." As courts cannot, will not, and possibly should not enforce
"welfare rights," as a matter of adjudicated Constitutional law, so, we conclude,
neither the Constitution, nor Constitutional law, nor Constitutional morality sug-
gest the existence of such rights. But, the article argues, all of these definitional
equivalencies are unfounded. Larry Kramer's important book makes the histori-
cal argument that this configuration-the legal question doctrine-was not al-
ways a part of the understanding of Constitutionalism. The article concludes that
a recognition the possibility of Constitutional and moral rights of welfare, and
duties to provide it, in the face of adjudicative reluctance to do so, will require a
major reorientation of our understanding of Constitutional jurisprudence-the
meaning of law and the nature of legal obligation-as well as a re-thinking of our
Constitutional history.
RESPONSE Larry Kramer 1173
II. STUDENT NOTES AND COMMENTS
"LEWD AND IMMORAL": NUDE DANCING,
SEXUAL EXPRESSION, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT Kevin Case 1185
Nude dancing is a particularly awkward fit with the First Amendment.
Should the Constitution protect this kind of "speech?" The question has vexed
the Supreme Court. While most of the Court has agreed that nude dancing falls
within the First Amendment, plurality opinions relegate nude dancing to the
"outer ambit" of shielded speech, setting forth confusing and ultimately unsus-
tainable legal tests.
This Note contends that nude dancing can convey powerful and particular-
ized erotic messages of sexual desire, availability, and appreciation of the nude
female form. It is not mere "conduct." Moreover, arguments for categorizing
nude dancing as "low value" speech, such as those grounded in morality or aes-
thetics, fail to provide a principled basis for affording nude dancing lesser protec-
tion than is given to other types of expressive activity. This Note thus concludes
that nude dancing should receive full First Amendment protection, and that at-
tempts to regulate it should receive no lesser degree of Constitutional scrutiny.
THE USES OF HISTORY IN THE SUPREME COURT'S
TAKINGS CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE Jonathan Lahn 1233
In a series of seminal cases interpreting the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause, the United States Supreme Court has used arguments that can be called
"historical" to justify its holdings and negotiate the relationship between the
static language of the Constitution and the dynamic realities of American life.
While historical arguments have been a recurring theme in Takings Clause juris-
prudence over the past eighty years, the way in which they are used has shifted.
While historical accounts of changes in American society over time once served
to justify new forms of governmental intervention in the realm of private prop-
erty, a new historical discourse appears to be emerging. This "new" historical
argument identifies a static historical norm-a "historical compact," in Justice
Scalia's words-in early American society and seeks to bring modern Takings
Clause jurisprudence into harmony with it. This Note begins by examining the
way that history has been deployed in critical Takings Clause cases and identifies
two modes of historical argument within the case law. It then compares the con-
tent of the putative "historical compact" with the historical realities of the gov-
ernment/property interface in early America. Ultimately, it embraces the once-
prevalent "dynamic" use of history and concludes that the static "historical com-
pact" championed by conservative Justices in recent Takings Clause cases is not
a reflection of historical reality, but is rather a rhetorical device that masks judi-
cial activism as adherence to tradition.
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